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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
by
Walter W. Steele, Jr.*
Statutory Construction, Substantive Law, Juvenile Delinquency
A. Statutory Construction
As might be expected with any relatively new penal code, there are
several apparently conflicting provisions in the Texas Penal Code. One
example is section 16.01,1 defining the felony of unlawful possession of a
criminal instrument, which appears to overlap in part with section 32.21,2
defining forgery. 3 This apparent conflict was raised in Ex parteHarrell,4 in
which Harrell possessed a forged prescription with the intent to obtain a
controlled substance. Charged and convicted of the felony offense of possessing a criminal instrument under section 16.01, Harrell contended that he
should have been charged and convicted of the misdemeanor offense of
forgery under section 32.21. Applying a well-recognized rule of statutory
construction, 5 the court of criminal appeals held:
[Section 16.01] is a broad and general statute applicable to all types of
possession of criminal instruments with intent to use them in the
commission of an offense, etc., while possession of a forged writing
with intent to utter it is a forgery under. . . [section] 32.2 1(a)(1)(C) and
is a special statute .

.

.

. The statutes are in pari materia and when

construed together can be harmonized and given effect with the special
governing the general in the event of any conflict. .

.

. We conclude

that the petitioner was improperly convicted of unlawful possession of
a criminal instrument and should have been charged with forgery
6

In Baker v. State7 a different problem of statutory construction was
presented. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to sell marijuana.
* LLB., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University of Texas. Professor of Law
and Associate Dean for Clinical Education, Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Dallas, Texas.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 16.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

I.

2.
3.
affects
4.
5.

Id. § 32.21 (Vernon 1974).
Forgery is generally a misdemeanor unless the instrument altered or created is one that
title or a monetary obligation. See id. §§ 32.21(c)-(e).
542 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
The Code Construction Act provides:
If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be
construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the
provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception
to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and
the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 3.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

6. 542 S.W.2d at 173.
7. 547 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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The Controlled Substances Act, 8 however, does not contain a conspiracy
provision; Texas' only conspiracy provision is found in section 15.02' of the
Penal Code. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that
section 15.02 does not apply to offenses defined outside of the Penal Code;1
therefore, there is no offense of conspiracy to possess marijuana in Texas.
Section 1.0711 of the Texas Penal Code contains the definitions of most of
the significant terms in the Penal Code. One such term is "deadly weapon,"
defined in section 1.07(a)(l 1)(B) as "anything that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."' 2 That
definition is important because the display of a deadly weapon enhances the
punishment for many crimes. 13 In Danzig v. State 4 the court held that the
nature of wounds inflicted on the injured party is to be considered in
determining whether or not a weapon meets that statutory definition of
"deadly weapon."
B. Arrest
Although Terry v.
is approximately nine years old, this is the first
survey year that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made extensive
use of its doctrine. Greer v. State16 is a typical example. In Greer the
circumstances clearly amounted to less than probable cause, but the court
justified an arrest for driving while intoxicated on the grounds of "temporary detention for purposes of investigation." 7 After the driver in Greerwas
stopped he displayed signs of intoxication which justified turning the "temporary detention" into an arrest.' 8 Thus the need for grounds to arrest ab
initio was avoided. In Milton v. State'9 the tension between the relatively
strict standards for arrest and the more casual standards for stop and frisk is
even more evident. In Milton, the defendant expressly drew the court's
attention to article 14.04 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 20 which sets
forth a very narrow justification for arrest without a warrant. 21 After
conceding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to justify a
warrantless arrest, the court of criminal appeals evaded the issue by holding
Ohio 5

8. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1978).
9. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1974).

10. 547 S.W.2d at 628-29. Only the provisions of titles 1, 2, and 3 of the Penal Code apply to
offenses defined by other laws. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.03(b) (Vernon 1974). Since § 15.02 is
in title 4 of the Penal Code, it cannot apply to offenses defined outside the Penal Code.
11.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07 (Vernon 1974).

12. Id. § 1.07(a)(I1)(B).
13. See, e.g., id. § 22.02(a)(3) in the case of aggravated assault; id. § 30.02(d)(2) in the case
of burglary.
14. 546 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

392
544
Id.
Id.
549
Id.

U.S. 1 (1967).
S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
at 127.
at 128.
S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
at 192.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977) states:

Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender
is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer
may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.
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that there were grounds for a stop and frisk leading to discovery of narcotics

which justified the arrest post-factum.22
In those rare instances when officers do obtain a warrant to arrest a
suspect,23 the question arises as to what extent the warrant authorizes them
to enter the house of another in search of that suspect. In a lengthy and well-

reasoned opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that when
an officer holds a valid arrest warrant and reasonably believes that the
suspect is inside premises belonging to another, he2 4can legally enter those
premises for the purposes of arresting the suspect.

C. Entrapment
The accused's lack of predisposition to commit a crime is central to the
entrapment defense.25 Apparently, even an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise will not give rise to the
entrapment defense from a constitutional standpoint.2 6 In Guerrero v.
State,27 however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the conduct
of law enforcement agents shall be considered in an entrapment defense
along with the predisposition of the defendant. Furthermore, in the now
famous case of United States v. Bueno,28 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the government entrapped a drug defendant as a matter of law by
having an informer sell heroin to the defendant and then having an agent buy
the drug back from the defendant. In Hampton v. United States,29 however,
the Supreme Court apparently rejected the type of defense approved in
Bueno by emphasizing once again that the essence of entrapment is the
predisposition of the accused rather than intolerable government conduct.
Therefore, the question arises: Is the Bueno defense still available in the
Fifth Circuit? Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit has not provided an une22. 549 S.W.2d at 194.
23. See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
24. United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, cert. denied sub nom. Henry v. United States,
429 U.S. 959 (1976). The court, quoting from Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 606 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973), stated:
A search warrant was not necessary to execute an arrest warrant on the premises
of a third party; 'and although the person sought is not in the dwelling the actor is
privileged to use force if he reasonably believes him to be there-and enters in the
exercise of a privilege to make a criminal arrest under a valid warrant.
528 F.2d at 1017.
In Rodriguez, a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), the Fifth Circuit cited
with approval the standard of "reasonable belief" of the arresting officer adopted in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The privilege to make an arrest for a criminal offense carries with it the privilege
to enter [premises] in the possession of another for the purpose of making such an
arrest, if the person sought to be arrested is on the [premises] or if the actor
reasonably believes him to be there.
473 F.2d at 605-06 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 204 (1964)). See also Pecina v.
State, 516 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (authority to arrest under arrest warrant is not
limited to premises described in search warrant).
25. Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
26. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). The Court referred to such governmental
involvement as "over-zealous law enforcement." Nevertheless, the fact that the government
affords opportunities or facilities for the commission of the crime does not defeat the prosecution. Id. at 435.
27. 487 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
28. 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). In Hampton, as in Bueno, the accused sold to government agents
heroin which was allegedly supplied by a government informer.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

quivocal answer. In United States v. Evers30 the court stated: "The Court's
decision in Hampton v. U.S. .

.

. may well have eliminated the Bueno

United States v. Graves,32 however, the court referred to the
defense."
Evers opinion as one that merely "expressed doubt" as to the viability of
Bueno. 33 Subsequently, in United States v. Benavidez, 34 where the defendant appealed because the trial judge had refused his request for a Bueno
instruction, the Fifth Circuit stated: "In United States v. Hampton . . *
decided only a few days before the instant case, the Supreme Court effec3lIn

tively reversed United States v. Bueno .

. .

.The trial court was, therefore,

correct in refusing the requested instruction." 35 Thus it appears that the
Bueno defense is now foreclosed.
Despite its concentration on the defendant's lack of predisposition as the
sole element of the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court has left open the
possibility that there may be cases in which the conduct of law enforcement
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction. 36 Hypothetically, at least, one example of such outrageous conduct would be paying fees
to informants contingent upon the number of defendants betrayed. The facts
in United States v. McClure37 merit consideration. A Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agent hired an informant knowing that he had a "speckled
reputation." The agent promised the informant $50 for every new seller of a
gram of heroin and $100 for every new seller of an ounce; the DEA was the
informant's only source of income. Is a seller betrayed by such an informant
entitled to the defense that the DEA agent's conduct is so outrageous as to
violate due process? The answer, the court held, depends upon additional
factors or combinations of factors. For example, payment of contingent fees
to informants does not violate due process if the informant is instructed in
the law of entrapment, if the agent, and not the informant, makes the buy of
specific target in mind when the
contraband, and if the informant has no
38
made.
was
arrangement
fee
contingent
Craddock v. State39 presented an interesting dilemma for a defendant
trying to assert an entrapment defense. First, the defendant filed a motion to
suppress which was overruled. Then the defendant testified and admitted
possessing the items that were the fruits of the alleged illegal search, thereby
running afoul of the general rule that the legality of the search is moot if the
defendant testifies to or otherwise admits possessing the fruits of the
30. 552 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1977).
31. Id. at 1122. The court, however, also distinguished Bueno since in Bueno, unlike
Evers, the defendant was a victim of a "full circle" government scheme. Id. at 1123.
32. 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. Id. at 1324.
34. 558 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 309.
36. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
37. 546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977).
38. Id. at 673-74. See also United States v. Haynes, 554 F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1977). One
should note, however, that a combination of factors would further complicate the issue; for
example, if an informant, instructed in the law of entrapment, actually made the buy of
contraband.
39. 553 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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search ;40 however, in this case the defendant admitted possession in order to
establish an entrapment defense. Given the fact that the defendant in this
situation was forced either to waive his illegal search defense by admitting
possession or to waive his entrapment defense by not admitting possession,
the court of criminal appeals ruled that in those special circumstances the
defendant's admission of possession did not waive the search issue. To
force such a dilemma on the defendant would foster "an impermissible and
41
unconstitutional chill" on the defendant's right to assert all his defenses.
D. Competency to Stand Trial and Insanity as a Defense
Section 4(f) of article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure42
provides that if, after a hearing on the matter, a defendant is found competent to stand trial, the court shall dismiss the jury that decided that issue and
shall continue the trial with a separate jury. The reason for utilizing a
separate jury is so that a determination of a defendant's competency can be
made uncluttered by the evidence of the offense itself and vice versa. In
Martin v. Estelle43 the Fifth Circuit stated:
Such an uncluttered hearing makes it easier to determine fairly the issue
of competency without introducing facts which might tend to cloud the
issue at hand, 'facts which alone might [sic] so stir the minds of the jury
as to make difficult the exercise of calm judgment upon the question of
present [incompetency].'"
Regardless of these extra efforts to insure that the issue of competency is
kept separate from the issue of guilt, prosecutors sometimes employ the
tactic of packing the record in a competency hearing with evidence of the
alleged offense. Obviously, this prosecution tactic is an effort to prejudice
the jury's finding on competency by making them believe that the defendant
is a mean and a dangerous person who deserves to be dealt with as a criminal
instead of as a patient. Martin v. Estelle stands as a beacon for defense
lawyers who. wish to conduct competency hearings unfettered by such
biasing tactics from the prosecution. The Martin court reasoned as follows:
During appellant's competency trial, the prosecution continually introduced evidence material in the main only to the substantive offense
with which the appellant was charged. This is not to infer that any
mention of such facts would be prejudicial. But here highly inflammatory evidence was continually referred to before the competency jury,
coupled with argument by the prosecution that appellant would be 'back
on the streets' if found incompetent to stand trial. These circumstances
support Martin's position that he was denied a full, fair, and meaningful
competency trial ...
We conclude from a review of the state court transcript that appellant's competency 45trial was not full, fair, and meaningful for the reasons stated above.
40.

S.W.2d
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Stein v. State, 514 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Warren v. State, 514
458, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
553 S.W.2d at 766.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 4(f) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
546 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 179 (quoting Ramirez v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 38, 40, 241 S.W. 1020, 1021 (1922)).
546 F.2d at 179-80 (citations omitted).
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Although no statement made by a defendant during the examination or
hearing on his competency to stand trial may be admitted in evidence on the
issue of guilt,46 nevertheless, the decision to allow a defendant to testify at
his competency hearing is especially troublesome; if the prosecutor is allowed to explore into the facts of the alleged crime on cross-examination, he
may obtain discovery to which he would not otherwise be entitled. In a
footnote in Leyva v. State47 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that it
would be error to refuse a defendant the right to take the stand for the
limited purpose of establishing his mental condition if that were the issue
before the court. Henceforth, therefore, counsel for a defendant at a competency hearing should file a motion in limine seeking to limit the state's crossexamination of the defendant to the issue of competence. Under the authority of Leyva such a motion should be granted.
The last session of the Texas Legislature amended article 46.02, Incompetency to Stand Trial, and article 46.03, Insanity Defense. 48 For the most part,
the amendments are of minor significance, dealing mainly with administrative matters. It should be noted, however, that the time during which a
defendant may be involuntarily committed
for an examination of his compe49
tency has been set at twenty-one days.
E. Attempts
Attempt is defined in the Texas Penal Code in classic terms: "A person
commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an
act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect
the commission of the offense intended. " 50 Accordingly, lawyers in Texas
are faced with a classic problem: precisely what is meant by the phrase, "an
act amounting to more than mere preparation.1 51 To some extent, the
conundrum of where to draw the line between mere preparation on the one
hand and criminal attempt on the other has been simplified by recent wellreasoned opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.5 2 These cases were recently reaffirmed and summarized by the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Rivero.53 That opinion states the following criteria
for locating the line between preparation and attempt:
(1) the defendant must have the mens rea required for the commission
of the crime which he is charged with attempting; (2) the defendant's
46. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 3(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

47. 552 S.W.2d 158, 160 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
48.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 46.02, .03 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

49. Id. arts. 46.02, § 3(b), 46.03, § 3(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
50. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

51. See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), which held that an
allegation in the indictment that A attempted murder by promising B $100 to kill C was not a
sufficient allegation of acts beyond mere preparation. Therefore, the indictment did not allege
the crime of attempted murder, it only alleged the crime of solicitation.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976) (to constitute criminal
attempt defendant's acts must mark his conduct as criminal in nature; the acts should be unique
rather than so commonplace as to be engaged in by persons not in violation of the law); United
States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974) (to constitute criminal attempt conduct must
be substantial step toward commission of the crime, must corroborate the firmness of the
criminal intent, and must be more than remote preparation).
53. 532 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1976).
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conduct must be strongly corroborative of his criminal intent; (3) in
determining whether the conduct is corroborative, the fact finder must
examine the acts performed objectively without relying on other evidence of the defendant's intent; (4) as an additional objective measure,
the acts should be unique rather than so commonplace
that they are
54
engaged in by persons not in violation of the law.
Since attempt is an effort to commit some other offense, the question
arises as to whether the constituent elements of the other offense must be
set forth in an indictment for attempt. That problem was presented in Garcia
v. State,55 a case in which the indictment alleged that the defendant "did
then and there attempt to cause the death of [M.A.] by shooting him with a
gun, having at the time the specific intent to commit the offense of murder." 56 Murder may be committed either through an act intentionally or
knowingly designed to cause death or through an act intended to cause only
serious bodily injury that causes death instead.5 7 In Garcia, however, the
defendant made no complaint about the sufficiency of the indictment and
therefore the court did not reach the question of whether the indictment
must specify which particular type of murder was intended. The court of
criminal appeals did address the issue in Williams v. State,5 8 holding that an
indictment for attempted burglary that merely alleged "having intent to
commit burglary" was sufficient, although there are obviously several ways
in which burglary may be committed .5 9 The conclusion is, therefore, that an
indictment for attempt is not fundamentally defective for failure to allege
the constituent elements of the crime attempted.
Because of the peculiar wording of the statute defining robbery, the crime
of attempted robbery will probably be rare in Texas. Consider the facts of
Johnson v. State6° in which defendants entered a Safeway Store armed.
Immediately confronted by the police, who were lying in wait, one of the
defendants pointed a gun at the store manager and demanded keys to the
back door in order to escape. There was no evidence of a demand, taking, or
attempted taking of any money or other property from the store. Although
these facts look like a textbook-perfect case of attempted robbery, the
defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the conviction was
sustained by the court of criminal appeals. The rationale for such a result is
that the Texas statute defines robbery, inter alia, as the use of force in the
immediate flight from an attempted theft. 61 Thus, the crime of aggravated
robbery was committed even though money or other property was not
actually taken, because, under Texas law, the use of force during6 2 an attempted theft is sufficient conduct to comprise completed robbery.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 454-55.
541 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
Id. at 429.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
544 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
See generally TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974).
541 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
61. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 29.01(l), .02 (Vernon 1974).
62. 541 S.W.2d at 187.

434
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F. Murder
Most of the recent noteworthy developments in the law of criminal
homicide are probably of more interest to academicians than to practicing
lawyers. For example, one of the conundrums in the law of felony-murder is
whether or not the underlying felony must be a violent one. 63 The issue was
raised in Rodriguez v. State,6 which called for an interpretation of section
19.02(a)(3), the Texas felony-murder statute. 65 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that section 19.02(a)(3) does not require that the underlying
felony be a violent one.66
Somewhat like felony-murder, capital murder is a homicide committed
under the narrowly defined circumstances set forth in section 19.03 of the
Texas Penal Code. 67 One such circumstance is murder perpetrated in the
course of committing a robbery.68 In Smith v. State69 the defendant contended that his indictment for capital murder based on homicide committed
during a robbery was fatally defective for failing to allege the elements of
the underlying robbery. On appeal the court stated the general rule that an
indictment charging the perpetration of one offense during the commission
70
of another offense need not allege the elements of the latter offense.
In considering the issue of justifiable use of deadly force in Sternlight v.
State71 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated: "One of the most
drastic changes made in the new penal code is that before deadly force may
be used in self-defense the actor (defendant) is required to retreat if a
reasonable person in the actor's (defendant's) situation would have retreated." 72 For Texas to adopt the retreat rule is a drastic change; but even
more drastic is the fact that the court applied an objective test to determine
the actor's duty to retreat. In Sternlight the court approved the following
charge:
A person is justified in using deadly force against another if he would
be justified in using force against the other in the first place, as above
set out, and when he reasonably believes that such force is immediately
necessary to protect himself against the other person's use or attempted
use of unlawful deadly force, and if3a reasonableperson in defendant's
situation would not have retreated.1
63. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 71, at 547-48 (1972),
stating that the felony must be dangerous to life, i.e., either an inherently dangerous felony, or a
felony which in particular circumstances creates a foreseeable danger to human life.
64. 548 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
65. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974) provides:
A person commits an offense if he: . . . commits or attempts to commit a felony,
other than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, and in the course of and in
furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the
commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly danger-

ous to human life that causes the death of an individual.

66. 548 S.W.2d at 29. The court stated that the legislature had exempted only the felonies of
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter and refused to add to the statutory exemption.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 19.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
Id. art. 19.03(a)(2).
540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
Id. at 697.
540 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
Id. at 705.

73. Id. at 706 (emphasis added).
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Other jurisdictions that have adopted the retreat rule have applied the
subjective test, under which the defender need not retreat unless he knows
that he can do so in complete safety.74 The Model Penal Code also applies
the subjective test when it states, "The use of deadly force is not justifiable
. .if...
i
the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such
force with complete safety by retreating . . . . -75 Requiring a person to
accept the ignoble alternative of retreating before using deadly force in selfdefense can be easily justified as a civilized and humanistic approach;
however, requiring that person to accept the added burden of retreating
whenever the mystical "reasonable man" would have done so is an insult to
self-preservation.
G. Rape
At common law rape is a general intent crime, i.e., no specific mental
state is required. 76 Similarly, no mention of mental state is made in the
definition of rape contained in the new Texas Penal Code. 77 Nevertheless, in
Zachery v. State78 the court of criminal appeals found a rape indictment
fundamentally defective for failure to allege a mens rea. Pointing out that
mens rea is a requirement of section 6.02 of the Penal Code, 79 the court was
left with no choice but to hold that the indictment was fundamentally
defective.8 0
In Childs v. State8' the indictment alleged that the defendant committed
rape by threatening imminent infliction of death. Although no motion to
quash was filed, the defendant contended on appeal that the indictment was
fundamentally defective for two reasons. First, the indictment did not
82
directly specify the person threatened with imminent infliction of death.
Secondly, the indictment merely alleged "force and threats" without alleg83
ing the type of force or threats.
The court of criminal appeals overruled both contentions but pointed out
that the first contention would have been sustained if it had been raised
74. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 63, § 53, at 396.
75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1962).
76. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 63, § 28, at 196.
77. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.02 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1978).
78. 552 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

79. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 6.02(a)-(c) (Vernon 1974) states:
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section, a person does not
commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.
(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a
culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.
(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but
one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b) of this section, intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.
80. 552 S.W.2d at 137. See also Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(quashing indictment charging indecency with a child which failed to allege "intent to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person").
81. 547 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
82. Id. at 615. Section 21.03 of the Texas Penal Code defines aggravated rape as an offense
defined in § 21.02 which compels submission to the rape by threat of death to be imminently
inflicted upon anyone. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.03 (Vernon 1974).
83. 547 S.W.2d at 615; see TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 21.02(b)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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initially by a motion to quash. 84 As to the second contention, the court held
that the terms "force" and "threats" have only one meaning under the rape
85
statute and need no further elaboration.
In Blount v. State8 6 the court drew the distinction between rape and
aggravated rape in a classic set of facts. After the victim was raped by force
she was told that if she informed the police she would be killed. The
defendant was convicted in the district court of aggravated rape because of
that threat of death.87 Reversing the conviction, the court of criminal appeals
observed that the threat was insufficient to satisfy the requirement in the
definition of aggravated rape that the threat be imminent.88 Thus, to meet the
statutory requirement for aggravated rape, the threat employed must be one
to be imminently carried out, not one conditioned upon some later event
such as a call to the police.
H. False Imprisonment
By its nature false imprisonment is closely akin to kidnapping. The
confusing similarity between the two offenses is exacerbated by the definitions in the Texas Penal Code. 9 In Carpenterv. State' the State attempted
to charge the defendant with kidnapping, the indictment alleging that the
defendant intentionally and knowingly restrained K.R. without her consent.
Analyzing the sufficiency of this indictment, the court of criminal appeals
noted that the distinction between the felony of kidnapping and the misdemeanor of false imprisonment is the distinction between the word "abduct,"
which is a necessary element of kidnapping, and the word "restrain," which
is a necessary element of false imprisonment.9 1 Abduction is restraint intended to prevent the liberation of the victim; therefore, a kidnapping
indictment must allege that the restraint is intended to prevent liberation of
the victim. Since the indictment in Carpenteromitted this extra allegation, it
84. 547 S.W.2d at 615.
85. Id.; accord, Watson v. State, 548 S.W. 2d 676, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment
sufficient even though it did not allege the character of the force or specify the threats).
86. 542 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
87. Id. at 165. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.03(a) (Vernon 1974) defines aggravated rape as
follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits rape as defined in Section 21.02
of this code or rape of a child as defined in Section 21.09 of this code and he:
(1) causes serious bodily injury or attempts to cause death to the victim or
another in the course of the same criminal episode; or
(2) compels submission to the rape by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or
kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on anyone.
88. 542 S.W.2d at 166.
89. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 20.02, .03 (Vernon 1974).
90. 551 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
91. Section 20.01 of the Texas Penal Code provides:
In this chapter:
(1) 'Restrain' means to restrict a person's movements without consent, so as
to interfere substantially with his liberty, by moving him from one place to
another or by confining him. ...

(2) 'Abduct' means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation

by:(A)

secreting or holding him in a place where he
is not likely to be found; or
(B) using or threatening to use deadly force.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 20.01(l), (2) (Vernon 1974). See also id. §§ 20.02, .03.
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was held to charge no more than the misdemeanor offense of false imprisonment. 92

I. Burglary
93
There must be both an actus reus and a mens rea for every crime.
Although that doctrine is doubtlessly well understood at a philosophical
level, at a practical level the doctrine often creates confusion. The crime of
burglary provides a useful illustration. Too often lawyers confuse the actus
reus of burglary with the mens tea of burglary. For example, in Ex parte
Winton94 the indictment, tracking the language of section 30.02(a)(3),95 alleged that the defendant "did then and there enter a building without the
effective consent of

. .

.the owner, and therein attempted to commit and

committed theft."96 That indictment was held to be fundamentally defective
because it alleges only an actus reus; it wholly fails to allege a mens rea
because it does not use the words "intentionally," "knowingly," or "recklessly."97
A somewhat different aspect of the same problem was presented in Ex
parte Cannon.98 In Cannon the indictment alleged that the defendant "did
unlawfully, then and there, with intent to exercise control over the property
of [R.S.], enter a habitation without the effective consent of [R.S.], said
owner." 99 The Cannon indictment failed, however, to allege part of the
actus reus of burglary, to wit: entry or concealment with the intent to
commit a felony or a theft.100 According to the court in Cannon, that part of
the actus reus of burglary may be alleged in the indictment in one of two
ways: (1)
the elements of the theft or the named felony may be fully set out
in the indictment, or (2)the indictment may state in conclusive terms that the
entry was effected with intent to commit theft or a specifically named
felony. Since neither of these methods was followed in the Cannon indictment, it was held to be fundamentally defective.
Alleging the ownership of the property burglarized can sometimes raise
serious problems. For example, if a rented motel room is burglarized, how
should the ownership of the premises be alleged-in the title owner of the
property, in the guest assigned to the room, or in the motel manager? That
question was answered in Salas v. State. 10t The court held that ownership
for purposes of the indictment can be alleged in either the guest, the hotel
manager, or the title holder, because all of them have a greater right of
92. 551 S.W.2d at 726.
93. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 63, §§ 25, 28.
94. 549 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
95. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974) states: "(a) A person commits an
offense if, without the active consent of the owner, he: . . .(3) enters a building or habitation
and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft."
96. 549 S.W.2d at 752.
97. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
98. 546 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
99. Id. at 267.
100. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 30.02(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1974).
101. 548 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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possession than the defendant."°2 This question was thoroughly discussed in
Ex parte Davis, 10 3 a case with somewhat bizarre facts. Davis was charged
with capital murder on the grounds that he intentionally committed murder
in the course of committing burglary; it was alleged that he entered a
residence that had been set aside to his wife with intent to kill her and in the
process intentionally killed his stepdaughter. As one might expect, these
allegations gave rise to a rather thorough examination of the concept "owner," a term used in section 30.021° to define burglary and which is itself
defined in section 1.07(a)(24).10 5 In the Davis case, the court of criminal
appeals pointed out that the wife had been given temporary exclusive
possession of the house by a court order arising out of a pending divorce suit
although the legal title of the residence was in the defendant. According to
the court of criminal appeals, the Texas statute, by its use and definition of
the term "owner," is designed to protect those persons who have a greater
right to possession of the property than the criminal actor. Questions of
legal title, therefore, are largely irrelevant when alleging who is the owner of
the premises in a burglary case. °6
J. Theft
The specificity with which stolen property must be described in a theft
indictment is a common problem. 1w Changes in the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure might suggest that the legislature is moving towards requiring a
detailed description of stolen property. For example, the 1965 version of
article 21.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure read: "When it
becomes necessary to describe property of any kind in an indictment, a
general description of the same by name, kind, quality, number and ownership, if known, shall be sufficient;"'18 however, in 1975 the statute was
amended to read: "If known, personal property alleged in an indictment
shall be identified by name, kind, number, and ownership."'19 In Welch v.
State' 0 a theft indictment described the stolen property as "seven rifles."
The defendant contended that the indictment was defective for failing to
describe the property more specifically as a "243 Remington bolt action rifle
with a scope" and an "1892 Winchester."II Nevertheless, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the defendant, concluding that the 1975
102. The court noted that "owner" is defined in TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(24) (Vernon
1974) as a "person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or
not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." 548 S.W.2d at 53 (emphasis
added). See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.08 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

103. 542 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
104. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974).
105. Id. § 1.07(a)(24). See note 102 supra for the text of the statutory definition.
106. 542 S.W.2d at 196. See also Black v. State, 505 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)
(ownership sufficiently alleged in tenant who had right to occupy and control premises);
Gilbreath v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 616, 259 S.W.2d 223 (1953) (care, control, and management
may show ownership in law, but control and management must be proven).
107. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indictments and Informations §§ 137-42 (1968).
108. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.09 (Vernon 1966).
109. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 21.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
110. 543 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
111. Id. at 380.
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version of article 21.09 is not a substantive change from the 1965 version.' 1 2
Thus, if the legislature does in fact intend to give the defendant a right to a
specific and detailed description of the property he is accused of stealing, it
will have to amend article 21.09 once again.
Under section 31.03 of the Texas Penal Code, theft is committed in one of
two ways: either the property is taken by the actor without the owner's
consent, i.e., common law theft, or the actor appropriates the property
knowing that it is stolen, i.e., common law receiving and concealing." 3 In
Johnson v. State" 4 the court ruled that an indictment must specify which of
the two unlawful methods was used by the defendant. The indictment
disapproved in Johnson merely alleged that the defendant "did then and
there unlawfully exercise control over property . . . with the intent to
deprive the owner ....
."I" Long v. State" 6 also points up the importance
of making the distinction between the two forms of theft. In Long, the
indictment alleged one form of theft but the court charged the jury on the
other form of theft. The conviction was reversed because the court's charge
authorized the jury to convict under a theory not set forth in the indictment.
Other recent cases dealing with the law of theft point up some of the
nuances of the specialized theft provisions. Welfare fraud is a good example. The court of criminal appeals in Valdez v. State"7 held that welfare
fraud must be prosecuted under article 695c of the Public Welfare Act"18
rather than under the general theft provision in section 31.03 of the Texas
Penal Code. After the Valdez decision the legislature enacted Senate Bill
154 which amended the Public Welfare Act to change the penalty provisions
for welfare fraud;"19 however, in the process the legislature failed to include
a savings clause. The consequence appears to be that all welfare fraud cases
pending on May 25, 1977, the effective date of Senate Bill 154, are moot
because the law applicable to those cases no longer exists. 20
Forgery was formerly defined as creating a false instrument giving rise to
21
or defeating some pecuniary obligation such as a check or a release.'
Prosecutors experienced some difficulty with forgery cases if the forged
check was stamped by the bank with the word "Forgery." When a copy of
such a check was attached to the indictment it did not truly represent the
instrument allegedly forged, and clearly was not an instrument creating a
pecuniary obligation. 22 That problem, however, has been solved by the new
112. Id. The court noted that although the 1975 version omits the phrase "general description," it adds no specific requirements for describing property such as quality, brand name, or
date of manufacture.
113. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 31.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
114. 547 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
115. Id. at 600.
116. 548 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

117. 553 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
118. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 695c (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1978).
119. Id. art. 695c, § 34 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
120. See generally Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Webb v. Beto, 457 F.2d 346 (5th
Cir. 1972).
121.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. app. art. 979 (Vernon 1974) (repealed 1974).

122. See generally Payne v. State, 391 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
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Penal Code which defines forgery as any unauthorized writing purporting to
23
be the act of another.
Forgery, as defined in the new Penal Code, also includes passing or
otherwise uttering the forged instrument. 21 4 Since the mens rea for the crime
of forgery is the "intent to defraud or harm another,"' 25 one could commit
the offense by passing a forged instrument with the intent to harm another,
even though he does not realize that the instrument is a forgery. This
26
problem was dealt with by the court of criminal appeals in Jones v. State.'
The indictment alleged the passing of a forged instrument with intent to
defraud or harm another, but did not allege that the actor knew the instrument to be forged. The court of criminal appeals read into the statute the
requirement that the actor know that the instrument is forged, but went on to
hold that the indictment was not fundamentally defective for failure to allege
such knowledge. Although the court determined that the omission did not
render the indictment fundamentally defective when raised for the first time
on appeal, it pointed out that this defect could properly be raised by a
motion to quash. 127 Therefore, the state will henceforth be required to prove
both intent to defraud and knowledge that the instrument was forged.
K. Robbery
In the new Penal Code robbery is divided into three categories: (I) the"
classic, common-law type robbery defined in section 29.02;128 (2) "aggravated robbery," defined in section 29.03;129 and (3) one of the felonies
listed in section 19.03130 which leads to a charge of capital murder if the
victim is intentionally killed.
Aggravated robbery, a new concept, is attracting some attention in the
courts. In Robinson v. State13' the court pointed out that aggravated robbery
may be committed in two ways, and that the required culpable mental state
is different in each instance. Aggravated robbery can be committed if a
person causes serious bodily injury in the course of committing theft. The
culpable mental state for this form of aggravated robbery requires that the
act be performed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Aggravated robbery can also be committed if a person uses or exhibits a deadly weapon in
the course of committing theft. The culpable mental state for this form of
aggravated robbery requires an intentional or knowing act. Thus, the mental
states of knowledge or intent are common to both forms of aggravated
robbery, but the mental state of recklessness is applicable only to robbery
132
which results in serious bodily injury.
123.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 32.21(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1974); see Martinez v. State, 551

S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
124. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.21(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 1974).

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. § 32.21(b).
545 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
Id.at 777-78.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 29.02 (Vernon 1974).
Id. § 29.03.
Id. § 19.03(a)(2).
553 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
Id. at 373.
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In Robinson the indictment alleged only intentional and knowing use of a
deadly weapon. The court's charge to the jury, however, authorized a
conviction not only for that form of aggravated robbery, but for the other
form as well, that is, for intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing
serious bodily injury. The court of criminal appeals held that the trial court's
charge amounted to fundamental error, because it authorized a conviction
for crimes not alleged in the indictment.' 33
In Walker v. State1 34 the court discussed the kind of weapon that would
result in aggravated robbery under the "uses or exhibits a deadly weapon"
provision of section 29.03(a)(2).1 35 The court held that a forty-five automatic
pistol was a deadly weapon under the statute even though the clip and firing
1 36
pin were missing when the gun was found following the robbery.
As mentioned above, robbery is one of the felonies leading to a charge of
capital murder if the victim is intentionally killed.1 37 At the conclusion of the
evidence in such a case the court would presumably charge on murder
intentionally committed during a robbery, and then charge on robbery as a
lesser included offense. Nevertheless, such a charge was disapproved by the
court of criminal appeals in Woodkins v. State. 3 The court held that
robbery was not a lesser included offense of capital murder. Consequently,
one must assume that if the jury found that the murder was not intentional in
a capital case, their only alternative would be to return a verdict of not
guilty, necessitating a second trial on the robbery charge. Query: Would the
doctrine of carving prohibit the State from bringing an indictment for robbery? 3 9
L. Partiesto Crime
All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals have been
abolished in Texas, and each party is criminally responsible for the offense
as if he had committed it himself.140 An interesting application of that
principle is found in Cross v. State.'4 ' Cross testified that he was present and
participated in the planning of a robbery, but that he was too scared to
participate in the actual commission of the crime, and went home instead of
manning his lookout post. Because Cross acted with intent to promote the
robbery 4 2 and thus would have been an accomplice at common law, his
conviction for aggravated robbery was affirmed.
133. Id. at 373-75.
134. 543 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
135. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
136. The court stated: "We find that the forty-five automatic, even though missing a firing
°pin and without a clip when found (following the robbery), was 'manifestly designed and made
for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury ......
543 S.W.2d at 637. But cf.
Cook v. State, I I Tex. Crim. 19 (1881) (not an offense to carry the barrel and stock of a revolver
with the cylinder missing).
137. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).

138. 542 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
139. "Under the carving doctrine the State may carve as large an offense out of a single
transaction as it can but it must cut only once." Douthit v. State, 482 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972).
140. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.01 (Vernon 1974).
141. 550 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
142. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 7.02(a)(2), .03 (Vernon 1974).
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Juvenile Delinquency

143
Definitions. By definition in section 51.03 of the Family Code, "conduct
indicating a need for supervision" consists of relatively inoffensive conduct
that may result in an order of probation, but which cannot result in a
commitment to the Texas Youth Council.'" To the list of acts constituting
conduct indicating a need for supervision, the legislature has added
"conduct prohibited by city ordinance or by state law involving the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of paint and other protective coatings or glue and
other adhesives.' 145 Glue sniffing is normally charged as a Class C misdemeanor under a city ordinance, and heretofore, juvenile court jurisdiction
could not be acquired for glue sniffing unless the child committed the
offense on three or more occasions.' 46 Now, one act of glue sniffing will
apparently be adequate for a child in need of supervision (CINS) adjudication.
The 65th Legislature also made changes in the disposition of a person who
148
147
is adjudicated a CINS. Section 12(b) of article 5143d was repealed; the
net effect of the repeal is that if a CINS on probation is committed to the
Texas Youth Council for the delinquent act of violating that probation, he
can be housed by the Texas Youth Council with other delinquents. Under
such persons had to be housed separately from other
the former statute
49
1
delinquents.
Jurisdiction over juveniles may be vested by the juvenile board in either a
district court or a county court. 150 Since the district courts have twelveperson juries and the county courts have six-person juries, the number of
jurors hearing a juvenile's case clearly depends upon which court has been
designated as the juvenile court. In In re A.N.M. '5' this discrepancy in the
number of jurors was held not to contravene the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.
A serious question, however, has arisen regarding the jurisdiction of
county courts to hear juvenile matters generally. As mentioned above,
section 51.04(b) of the Family Code delegates to the juvenile board of every
county the power to designate a county court as the juvenile court. In 1974
the Texas attorney general issued Opinion No. H-325,"I stating, inter alia,
"It is clear that jurisdiction of the juvenile court comes from an act of the
Legislature and not from the juvenile board. . . .Section 51.04 . . .does
not confer the jurisdiction of a juvenile court on courts not already possessing it." In a later case, E.S. v. State, 53 the court held that designation by

143. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
144. d. §§ 54.04(d)(1), (2) (Vernon 1975).
145. Id. § 51.03 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
146. Id. § 51.03(b)(1)(B).
147. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 693, § 25, at 2159.
148. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5134d, § 12(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
149. 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 693, § 25, at 2159.
150. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04(b) (Vernon 1975).
151. 542 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
152. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-325 (1974).
153. 536 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
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the juvenile board under section 51.04(b) cannot enlarge the jurisdiction of a
county court at law beyond that conferred in the court's enabling legislation.
Consequently, all courts exercising juvenile jurisdiction may be forced to
rely for their powers not only upon a designation by the juvenile board, but
also upon a grant of power in the enabling legislation for that particular
court. Unfortunately, the list of powers contained in enabling legislation for
the courts in this state varies tremendously from court to court, 154 and the
power over matters affecting minors is not uniformly included. Lawyers,
therefore, would do well to read carefully the enabling legislation of every
juvenile court with which they deal.
Pleading and Pre-Trial. In criminal courts an indictment for one offense
will often authorize a conviction for other lesser included offenses; in civil
courts, however, all of the elements of each cause of action must be
pleaded, and nothing will be implied by innuendo. In A.E.M. v. State155 the
apparent inconsistency between those two doctrines was brought to light. In
A.E.M. the petition for delinquency charged the juvenile with aggravated
rape, but at the conclusion of the evidence the court charged not only on
aggravated rape but also on the lesser included offenses of rape, aggravated
assault, and assault. On appeal the practice of charging the jury on lesser
included offenses, as in criminal cases, was approved. Nevertheless, the
case was reversed because of another pitfall that faces judges whenever a
lesser included offense is involved. The trial judge admonished the juvenile
only on the aggravated rape charge. "The court did not tell appellant that he
could be found to have engaged in delinquent conduct if the jury found that
he had committed the offense of . . . rape, or the offense of aggravated
assault.' 56 The conviction was therefore reversed because of the trial
court's failure to comply strictly with section 54.03(b) 5 7 which requires that
the juvenile be fully warned by the judge of the consequences of trial. 158
In particular, the court of civil appeals held that the juvenile court failed
to give the explanation required in section 54.03(b) by merely inquiring
whether the juvenile's attorney had discussed the charge of aggravated rape
with him, and whether the attorney had explained his rights to him. The
court stated:
The [trial] court, in fact, 'explained' nothing to appellant. The explanation is essentially an inquiry as to whether appellant's attorney had
'explained' the allegations to appellant. The court made no effort to
explain the meaning of the term, 'aggravated rape.' The court did not
explain that, under the allegation of aggravated
rape, he could also be
59
found guilty of rape or aggravated assault. 1
154. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-301e.1, § 2a (Vernon Supp. 1978)

(granting Bexar County Court at Law Nos. 4 and 5 jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters
affecting minors"). Cf. id. art. 1970-301d, § 2 (Vernon 1964) (granting Bexar County Court at
Law No. 3 jurisdiction over juvenile matters not mentioned in enabling statute).
155. 552 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
156. Id. at 955.
157. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b) (Vernon 1975).
158. See generally In re N.S.D., 555 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ)
(trial court must comply with mandatory requirements of § 54.03(b) including explanation of
right against self-incrimination).
159. 552 S.W.2d at 955. According to the court:
To 'explain' is to make something plain. It is difficult to conclude that a statement
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Section 53.05160 of the Family Code requires that the hearing shall be set
not later than ten days after the petition is filed if a child is in detention. In In
re J.R.C. 161the hearing date was delayed beyond ten days because of a need
for psychological reports and various pretrial hearings. On appeal the
juvenile argued that the proceedings against him should have been dismissed
for failure to provide a speedy trial. Rejecting this argument, the court
emphasized the cause of the delays and stated:
Section 53.05 merely requires that the time initially set for the hearing
be not later than 10 days after the filing of the petition. It does not
preclude continuing the hearing by agreement or for good cause ...
As for delays which occurred after the time initially set for the hearing,
appellant participated in or was responsible for a considerable portion
of those delays, and under
the record presented here he is in no position
62
to complain of them. 1
Mental Illness. Sections 55.01 and 55.03163 of the Texas Family Code deal
with the procedure for committing a mentally retarded juvenile charged with
a delinquent act. These sections were amended by the 65th Legislature to
make them conform with the Mentally Retarded Persons Act. 164 In doing so,
the legislature created a statutory definition of the level of retardation that
will authorize a court to commit.165
Recent cases demonstrate the importance of the mental illness and mental
retardation provisions of the Family Code."6 In In re A.N.M. 167 the court of
civil appeals construed section 55.05(b) which states:
If it appears to the juvenile court, on suggestion of a party or on the
court's own notice, that a child alleged to have engaged in delinquent
conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may not be responsible as a result of mental disease or defect, the court shall order
appropriate medical and psychiatric inquiry to assist in determining
whether the child is or is not responsible.168
The phrase "may not be responsible" in this section was construed on
appeal to mean a reasonable possibility rather than a reasonable probability
that the minor is mentally irresponsible.' 69 Therefore, if mental illness is

Id.

of an assumption by the court that the required explanation has been given by
someone else, followed by a question asking whether appellant had discussed the
Icontents' of the State's pleading with appellant, made anything plain to anyone.

160. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.05 (Vernon 1975).

161. 551 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
162. Id. at 755.
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 55.01, .03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1978).
164. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

165. The standard is set out in § 55.03(a) as follows:
If the court finds that the results of. . . comprehensive diagnosis and evaluation
indicate a significantly subaverage general intellectual function of 2.5 or more
standard deviations below the age-group mean for the tests used existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior of Levels I-IV, the court shall initiate
proceedings to order commitment of the child to a facility for the care and
treatment of mentally retarded persons.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

166. Id. §§ 55.01-.05 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1978).
167. 542 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
168. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.05(b) (Vernon 1975).

169. 542 S.W.2d at 918.
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suggested by any party and there is at least some evidence to corroborate it,
the court must order testing and conduct an inquiry.
The holding in A.N.M. is further explicated in Meza v. State. 70 In Meza a
motion was filed by the juvenile's attorney suggesting "mental illness or
defect," but there was no evidence in the record to support the motion. To
the contrary, the evidence was that the juvenile had no symptoms of mental
illness. The trial court overruled the motion, and that ruling was sustained
on appeal. 171 Consequently, it can be said with confidence that the mere
filing of a motion suggesting mental illness is not sufficient without some
supporting evidence placed in the record.
R.K.A. v. State1 12 is probably the most significant case yet decided
concerning the determination of mental illness by the juvenile court. R.K.A.
examines the relationship between various mental conditions such as mental
illness, insanity at the time of the act, mental capacity to proceed, as well as
the relationship between those mental states and a transfer proceeding.
According to R.K.A. only ,the question of mental capacity to proceed as
defined in section 55.04173 can be litigated at a transfer hearing.
The court, however, did not adequately discuss its rationale for holding
that other mental conditions defined in chapter 55 do not apply to transfer
proceedings. Other mental conditions defined in chapter 55 which arguably
apply to transfer proceedings are sections 55.02(a) and 55.03(a). Section
55.02(a) states:
If it appears to the juvenile court, on suggestion of a party or on the
court's own notice, that a child alleged by petition or found to have
engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may be mentally ill, the court shall initiate proceedings to order
74
temporary hospitalization of the child for observation and treatment.
Section 55.03(a) states:
If it appears to the juvenile court, on the suggestion of a party or on the
court's own notice, that a child alleged or found to have engaged in
delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may be
mentally retarded, the court shall . . . initiate proceedings to order
commitment of the child 175
to a facility for the care and treatment of
mentally retarded persons.
A child who appears before a court for a transfer hearing is also a "child
alleged by petition, . . to have engaged in delinquent conduct" as described in section 55.02, or a "child alleged . . . to have engaged in delinquent conduct" as described in section 55.03. Consequently, the holding in
R.K.A., that the conditions of mental illness and mental retardation are not
to be litigated in a transfer hearing, ignores rather plain language to the
contrary in sections 55.02 and 55.03.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

543 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
Id. at 191.
553 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.04(a) (Vernon 1975).
Id. § 55.02(a) (emphasis added).
Id. § 55.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
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Dominguez v. State 7 6 provides useful insight into the procedure to be
followed whenever a child is returned from a mental institution after a
commitment on a finding of lack of capacity to stand trial. Dominguez held
that after the child is returned, a hearing must be held, and an order entered
judicially declaring the child fit to proceed. Without such a hearing the
court's original order, declaring the child unfit to proceed, continues in
effect, and any further proceedings are a nullity.
Confessions. Section 52.02 of the Texas Family Code requires that a
person taking a child into custody must release the child to a parent or bring
the child to a suitable office designated by the juvenile court "without
unnecessary delay and without first taking the child elsewhere."' 177 In response to section 52.02, many police departments have secured an order
from the juvenile court designating police headquarters as a suitable place to
take a child after arrest. In In re D.M.G.H. ,178 however, there was apparently nothing in the record to establish that the local police headquarters had
been so designated; but the record did show that the child was held at police
headquarters from 12:30 p.m. to 10:20 p.m., during which time he confessed. On appeal the confession was disallowed because of the obvious
violation of section 52.02. Query: If a child is taken to police headquarters
following an arrest, who has the burden of establishing in the record that the
police headquarters has been, in fact, properly designated as a suitable place
for holding the juvenile? Can a court take judicial notice of a previously
entered designation order? R.C.S. v. State179 is another case in which a
confession was disallowed on appeal because of illegal police conduct. A
confession was taken from a child in violation of section 51.09 I80 of the
Texas Family Code which requires specified prior warnings by a magistrate
in order for the statement to be admissible. In an effort to cure the obvious
illegality, the police took a second confession two days later. On the second
occasion the police complied with section 51.09, but did not advise the
magistrate who gave the warnings that the child had confessed without
warnings two days earlier. In disallowing the second confession as fruit of
the poisonous tree, the appellate court said, inter alia:
Apparently, the question is whether the second statement, viewed in
the light of the 'totality of the circumstances,' is free from the coercive
influences which render the first inadmissible ...
Our courts have recognized that once a confession is given, the
ability of the accused to resist the information-seeking process is substantially reduced. The impact of a warning given after the first incriminating statement has been made is much weaker than it would have
been absent a prior confession, for one cannot be reasonably expected
to persist in the denial of that which he has already admitted.' 8'
176.
177.
178.
179.

546 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 52.02 (Vernon 1975).
553 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
546 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).

180. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

181.

546 S.W.2d at 947.
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If the police had informed the warning magistrate of their earlier illegal
conduct, thus allowing the magistrate an opportunity to fully explain the
circumstances to the child and to assure the child that he was not required to
repeat his earlier confession, the result in this case might have been different. The most significant new case concerning confessions by juveniles is
82
In that case the procedure outlined in section 51.09(b)
E.A. W. v. State."
had been scrupulously followed. Yet the juvenile, an eleven-year-old girl of
average intelligence and sixth grade education, had remained from midnight
to 9:00 a.m. in the Juvenile Detention Center without guidance from parents,
any adult in loco parentis, or an attorney. In these circumstances the court
of civil appeals held that the juvenile did not waive her fifth amendment
privilege. Significantly, the court stated: "In our opinion, a child of such
immaturity and tender age cannot knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waive her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in the absence
of the presence and guidance of a parent or other friendly adult, or of an
attorney.""1 3 E.A.W. negates the notion that a confession is valid, ipso
facto, whenever section 51.09 is meticulously followed. At a minimum,
E.A. W. makes the validity of a confession given by a juvenile a matter of
case-by-case determination. The probable result of this decision is that
counsel for the juvenile will henceforth habitually raise an issue as to the
validity of the child's confession on the grounds that the child was not
sufficiently mature or intelligent to make the decision to waive fifth amendment privileges and to incriminate himself. An extra-judicial confession by
an adult must be corroborated with other evidence of the corpus delicti.'14 In
R.C.S. v. State,"5 in a carefully reasoned opinion, the court held that the
same rule applies to proceedings in juvenile court. In In re A.N.M., however, the notion of procedural parity between adult and juvenile cases was
not sustained.18 6 Invoking the rule that an adult defendant must be formally
identified in court as the person who committed the crime, the juvenile in
A.N.M. contended that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him an
instructed verdict because he was not so identified. On the rather threadbare
theory that a juvenile delinquency trial is a civil action rather than a criminal
action, the court in A.N.M. held that it is not necessary to formally identify
a juvenile defendant in court if there8 7 is some other evidence in the record
that the juvenile committed the act.1
Transfer. Subsection (f) of section 54.02188 lists six factors which a
juvenile court must consider in determining whether to transfer a juvenile
182. 547 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
183. Id. at 64.
184. See, e.g., Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (proof of corpus
delicti of crime may not be made by extra-judicial confession alone; but if there is some
evidence corroborating the confession, confession may be used in establishing corpus delicti).
See also Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Bosquez v. State, 166
Tex. Crim. 147, 311 S.W.2d 855 (1958).
185. 546 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
186. 542 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
187. Id. at 919.
188.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f) (Vernon 1975).
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from the juvenile court to the appropriate district court for trial as an adult.
Several recent cases make the cogent point that although all six factors must
be considered, it is not necessary that all six factors be clearly established.189
Thus, a child who does not seem sufficiently sophisticated and mature as
required by section 54.02(f)(4) may be transferred, nevertheless, if he meets
several of the other criteria mentioned in section 54.02(f). Sufficiency of the
evidence at a transfer hearing continues to be a problem. In B.L.C. v.
State' 90 the sufficiency problem arose because there was no evidence
connecting the juvenile to the alleged felony except a confession introduced
over the objection of the juvenile's counsel. Referring to section 54.02(f)(3),
the court reasoned that whether or not there is enough evidence for a grand
jury to indict is a factor to be considered; since a grand jury is not a proper
forum to determine the admissibility of a confession, a transfer hearing was
likewise not a proper forum to consider the admissibility of a confession. 19'
In reaching that result, the court seemed to overlook or to simply ignore the
fact that a transfer hearing takes place in a court-not a grand jury-and that
questions of admissibility of evidence are inextricably a court's business,
although concededly not the business of a grand jury.
R.E.M. v. State' 92 raised another issue concerningadmissibility of evidence at a transfer hearing. An earlier transfer order had been set aside on
appeal, and in the second attempt to transfer the juvenile the state sought to
introduce a transcript of some of the testimony from the previous hearing
without establishing the required predicate for the admission of such testimony. Relying on the "settled rule in this State," the court rejected use of
the transcript unless a predicate for its use is laid by showing that the
witness is dead, insane, physically unable to testify, or beyond the juris193
diction of the court.
189. See In re J.R.C., 551 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (section 54.02 does not require that all matters listed in subsection (f) be established for
juvenile court to waive jurisdiction); cf. R.E.M. v. State, 541 S.W.2d 841, 846-47 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (to transfer juvenile for trial as an adult evidence
should be shown concerning a majority of the factors which subsection (f) requires the juvenile
court to consider).
190. 543 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. Id.at 154.
192. 541 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. Id.at 845.

